Server token rotation ADR

Signed-off-by: Derek Nola <derek.nola@suse.com>

docs/adrs/server-token-rotation.md

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+# Support Rotating Server Tokens
+
+Date: 2023-08-13
+
+## Status
+
+Proposed 
+
+## Context
+
+
+### Current tokens
+
+See the existing [Support `kubeadm`-style Bootstrap Token Secrets](agent-join-token.md) ADR 
+for more background on current token support.
+
+Important to this discussion is the fact that the `--token` value is used as the passphrase input
+used to generate the encryption key for cluster bootstrap data. For this reason, all server nodes 
+must use the same token value once the cluster has been started, and the token value cannot be changed.
+
+### Security Considerations
+
+This is a paraphase of @macedogm words concerning the security implications of the current token implementation:
+
+1. Proactiveness: users want to rotate the token periodically as security best practices recommend,
+which minimizes the risk of malicious access to the cluster in case the token is leaked. This is 
+effective when the rotation happens before a malicious user has the chance to actually use the token.
+
+2. Reactiveness: users want to rotate the token after it's detected that the token leaked. Here we 
+should assume the worst case scenario. Similar when the root credentials of a server is leaked and
+the server is compromised, we can only be sure of its security and trustworthiness after performing
+a clean reinstall (given all the existing stealth rootkits and backdoors that can cause the server to 
+be reinfected multiple times). It is assumed that paranoid users and governmental agencies would perform
+this action. In this event, token rotation is not enough, only with the clean reinstall one can be 100%
+sure of the cluster's security state.
+
+### Existing Work
+
+In past K3s versions, we did not require cluster to be started with a token. When we mandated support
+for tokens, we migrated empty string tokens to a randomly generated token. This migration can be
+reused to support the rotation from an old token to a new token.
+
+
+### New Token Rotation
+
+The new token rotation feature will allow the user to rotate the token value used to encrypt cluster bootstrap data.
+
+A new subcommand `k3s token rotate`, will be added to the `k3s` binary. This subcommand can either:
+1: take a new supplied token value or 2: Generate a 16 character token and then replace the existing token.
+The /var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/token file and passwd file will be updated with the new token value.
+Admins can then use the new token value to rejoin existing server nodes or join new server nodes to the cluster.
+
+Similar to the `k3s certificate rotate` and the `k3s secret-encrypt rotate-keys` subcommands,
+the `k3s token rotate` subcommand will be wrapper for an API request to the server to perform the decryption
+with the old token, and then reencryption of the bootstrap data with the new token. After reenecryption, the 
+bootstrap data will be updated with the modified token and passwrd files, allowing propgation of the files to
+existing servers upon restart.
+
+### Token Rotation Workflow
+
+HA configuration:
+
+1a) On server 1 run:
+```
+k3s token rotate -t <OLD_TOKEN>
+```
+
+OR
+1b)  On server 1 run:
+
+```
+k3s token rotate -t <OLD_TOKEN> <NEW_TOKEN>
+```
+
+2) If 1a) Retrieve the new token value from the /var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/token file on server 1
+```
+vi /var/lib/rancher/k3s/server/token
+```
+
+3) Stop and restart the k3s server process on servers 2 and 3 with the new token value:
+
+```
+systemctl stop k3s
+# edit /etc/rancher/k3s/config.yaml and update the token value
+systemctl start k3s
+```
+
+## Decision
+
+
+## Consequences
+
+Documentation the is explicit around the cluster token is compromised. Tt's strongly recommend to do a clean cluster reinstall, since this is the only way to be sure of the cluster's security state - eliminating the possibility that backdoors could have been planted by a malicious user".